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Abstract 
Background and purpose: This paper urges revision of the way attributions are conceptualised, 
investigated, and applied in sport psychology. There has been a recent decline in attribution 
research in sport psychology, despite the generally accepted relevance of attributions in applied 
settings. In seeking closer links between attribution theory, research, and practice, we argue that 
there is a mismatch between research and practice in sport psychology. 
Methods: Relevant literature is reviewed and theoretical arguments offered within seven sub-
headings: attribution theory in practice; linking consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus 
information to attribution dimensions; controllability as the primary attribution dimension; the 
generalisability of controllability; assessing attributions; implications for practice; and the social 
context. 
Results and conclusions: Research within sport psychology should focus on the central issue of 
how controllability attributions generalise across time, situations, and people. Measurement 
should reflect this approach to research within the field of attributions, and to this end, 
researchers might consider using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry. 
Practitioners should use consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information to challenge 
clients’ attributional thinking and help them attain adaptive perceptions of controllability. 
Practitioners should also help clients to be their own psychologist. Future research and practice 
should include a consideration of the social context in which attributions are shaped. 
 
Keywords: attributions; causal attribution dimensions; attributional retraining; controllability 
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Attribution in sport psychology: Seeking congruence between theory, research and practice 
In sport psychology, there has been a decline in frequency of published studies featuring 
attributions as the primary topic of interest (Biddle, 1999). This is despite attribution theory 
being a popular topic in the 1970s and one of the “hot topics” of the 1980s (Biddle, 1999; Biddle, 
Hanrahan, & Sellars, 2001). We hope that this paper inspires readers to regenerate research 
inquiry into this important topic. To achieve this aim, we provide a critical review of past 
research, and propose a focus for the future. 
Attributions can be considered under the general heading of explanation (see, e.g., 
Anderson, Krull, & Weiner, 1996). By explaining the causes of events, people create an 
understanding that they take with them into future situations, and this helps them develop 
mastery over their lives (White, 1959). The reflections of Heider (1944, 1958) addressed these 
issues and initiated interest in attributions. Heider considered people naïve psychologists, who 
try to better understand their own and others’ behaviour by piecing together information helping 
them to link behaviour to its root cause. According to Heider, people use a layperson’s form of 
science that serves a similar purpose to that of scientific research (e.g., Hempel, 1966), namely, 
to increase control over the environment, and to satisfy a desire to understand and gain 
knowledge about the world. In a similar way, people also try to derive explanations for their 
performances in sport. The issues for sport psychology are how people do explain these 
performances and pinpoint the root cause of them, and what impact an in-depth search for these 
causes has on future emotions, expectations and performance. This paper focuses attention 
primarily on attributions for failure, rather than attributions for success. This is because negative 
and/or unexpected events are generally believed to be more likely to lead to causal search (e.g., 
Lau & Russell, 1980; Wong & Weiner, 1981). 
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Building upon the foundations laid by Heider (1944, 1958), Jones and Davis (e.g., 1965) 
developed Correspondent Inference Theory. This theory focuses on the psychological processes 
involved when people make judgements about the dispositions and intentions of others, as a 
result of observing their actions. Correspondence is high when it is believed that a certain action 
truly reflects the underlying disposition of the actor. A correspondent inference is therefore 
derived by extrapolating from observation of some behaviour or act to the disposition of the 
person being observed; for example, in relation to a poor performance in sport, extrapolating 
rightly or wrongly from this one event the inference that the person is poor at sport. 
Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model built upon and extended the work of Heider (1958) and 
Jones and Davis (1965), placing it in a much more accessible format (Gilbert, 1998). According 
to Kelley, people use three types of information (consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus) to 
link outcomes to causes. F!rsterling (1988) also suggested that by using consistency, 
distinctiveness, and consensus information people can be helped to overcome the negative 
impact of making maladaptive attributions. Sport psychologists probably intuitively use these 
concepts as well. For example, having lost a match, a tennis player might become despondent, 
saying, “I’m just no good. I feel like giving up.” A sport psychologist might challenge this way 
of thinking, asking questions that help the player reassess her initial post-match reaction. Using 
consistency information, the psychologist might ask about other times the player performed well. 
Using distinctiveness information, the psychologist might ask about aspects of her performance 
that were good, even though she lost the match. Using consensus information, the psychologist 
might ask whether other players have been in a similar situation, had similar feelings, but pulled 
through. The psychologist might use all three types of information (or just one or two, depending 
on the most important aspect to work on) to help the sportsperson develop a clearer and 
Attribution 6 
potentially more adaptive and functional way of thinking. These concepts are, however, rarely 
mentioned in sport psychology research on attributions. This suggests a mismatch between 
research and practice in sport psychology. 
Attribution Theory in Practice 
Attributional retraining (F!rsterling, 1988) involves manipulating dysfunctional 
attributional thought, to help produce functionally adaptive ways of attributing. For example, in 
relation to improving the academic performance of college freshmen, Wilson and Linville (1982, 
1985) provided their participants with consensus and consistency information. Those unhappy 
with their academic achievements were encouraged to believe that other students experienced 
similar problems (using consensus information) and that these problems later disappeared (using 
consistency information). 
In general (social) psychology, attributional retraining has been guided by the 
attributional model of achievement motivation proposed by Weiner (e.g., Weiner, 1979, 1985, 
1986; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971), the reformulation of the 
learned helplessness hypothesis (Abramason, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), and the self-efficacy 
theory of Bandura (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 1982). Recent studies in sport psychology have provided 
support for the beneficial influence of attributional retraining on emotions, expectations and 
performance. Such studies claimed to have employed an attributional retraining method based 
either solely on the perspective of Weiner (Orbach, Singer, & Murphey, 1997; Orbach, Singer, & 
Price, 1999), on all three above models (Miserandino, 1998), or on all three models in addition to 
a non-explicit use of Kelley’s (1967) consensus and consistency information (Sinnott & Biddle, 
1998). 
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In dealing with the consequences of failure, it has generally been considered that the 
principal prescription derived from attribution models is to recommend people make attributions 
to lack of effort. This is because the psychological consequences of attributing failure to 
something that can change, such as a lack of effort (one can increase or decrease effort 
expenditure), should be more beneficial than attributing failure to something that is less 
amenable to change, such as lack of ability. It also affords the opportunity for increasing effort in 
future attempts at the task, hopefully leading to more favourable outcomes. The emphasis on lack 
of effort attributions can, however, be challenged (Biddle, 1993; Biddle et al., 2001). Following 
failure, when people subsequently try hard (put in more effort), attributions to lack of ability 
increase dramatically (Covington & Omelich, 1979). This may be partly due to the perception 
that the extra effort is compensating for a lack of ability. Further, if there is continued failure, 
attributions to low ability become even more likely, because further increases in effort still lead 
to failures. Anderson (1983) also alluded to this point: 
Any attempt to modify a person’s attributions assumes that the problem situations can be 
controlled, and the person can learn from failures, can improve with practice, and can 
reach an acceptable level of success. But in many cases, failure is guaranteed, either by 
particular ability deficits or by the setting of unrealistic goals. In such cases, maintaining 
high-motivation levels may be more maladaptive than is recognising the hopelessness of 
the situation and giving up that particular goal. (p. 1146) 
If, for example, a runner had already been expending high effort, but had failed to reach a race 
final, then encouraging him to attribute the failure to lack of effort might simply demoralise him 
(see, e.g., Robinson, 1990). If the qualifying standard were simply too difficult to meet, then 
encouraging attributions to lack of effort might serve little purpose, because increasing effort 
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would probably do little to improve outcomes. If the wrong race strategy were used, then 
increasing effort would not logically lead to improved outcomes, if the same strategy were used 
in future. 
Instead of attributing to lack of effort following failures, there has been a shift to 
encouraging attributions to poor strategy (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Biddle, 1993; Biddle et al., 
2001; Clifford, 1986; Curtis, 1992; Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996; Holschuh, Nist, & Olejnik, 
2001; Sinnott & Biddle, 1998). Anderson (1983) wrote: “Viewing one’s failures as the result of a 
poor strategy should lead one to attend to strategic features of the task, to expect improvement as 
one learns effective strategies, and to actually perform better” (p. 1144). Instead of increasing 
effort, this could lead to success being achieved reasonably effortlessly, because strategy is 
something that could be changed relatively quickly and easily. 
The creation of a general prescription, whereby supposedly inappropriate attributions are 
altered to attributions to lack of effort (or strategy) probably does not match the experiences of 
practitioners within sport psychology. Indeed, an attribution to either effort or strategy would not 
necessarily address Anderson’s (1983) additional point that sometimes it may be better to simply 
give up a particular goal. There are also times when it may be better to attribute failure to context 
specific lack of ability and focus efforts elsewhere, though whether more or less psychological 
damage would occur if this were done earlier or later is not clear. 
Most practitioners would, nonetheless, recognise in their work the basic tenet of 
attribution theory: the best method for altering a client’s unrealistic and dysfunctional 
attributions is to use information in testing these attributions against reality (see, e.g., F!rsterling, 
1988). F!rsterling suggested that the covariation principle of Kelley (1967) should be a primary 
source of support for helping to generate information about a client’s unrealistic or dysfunctional 
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attributions. By focusing on consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information, one can 
help people to better understand the cause of an event and help them deal with problems. 
Because these three types of information help people deal with problems (F!rsterling, 1988), 
their use should be reflected in the research sport psychologists do. In the following section, we 
make a link between these three types of information and attribution dimensions. 
Linking Consistency, Distinctiveness, and Consensus Information to Attribution Dimensions 
A central premise within attribution research is that there is a dimensional structure 
underlying the explanations people give for events, and by categorising explanations into 
dimensions, one can better understand those explanations. As noted by Biddle (1993), “the 
majority of sport-related attribution research has used a Weinerian perspective” (p. 439), and to 
date that statement still remains true. According to Weiner et al.’s (1971) perspective, 
explanations could be assigned to a combination of two attribution dimensions, locus of causality 
and stability. This work was founded upon academic achievement in the classroom and related to 
a person’s attributions for his/her own successes and failures. The locus of causality dimension 
referred to whether a cause could be located inside or outside the person (internal or external 
attributions); the stability dimension referred to whether the cause would remain stable or might 
change over time (stable or unstable attributions). Later deductive theorising (Weiner, 1979) led 
to the identification of a third dimension, controllability, referring to whether the cause be 
viewed as controllable or uncontrollable. 
Two further dimensions were highlighted by Abramson et al.’s (1978) reformulation of 
the learned helplessness hypothesis. The original learned helplessness model (Maier & Seligman, 
1976) was based upon the reactions of subjects (initially animals) to situations in which 
perceptions of uncontrollability were induced. For example, researchers would immobilise a dog 
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and place it in an experimental setting that eliminated the possibility of terminating an electric 
shock. When transferred to a setting wherein the same negative stimulus was used, but this time 
with the possibility to escape the stimulus, the dog would simply sit and endure the shocks. The 
dog had learned helplessness. This response was not, however, consistently demonstrated in 
humans, leading to a reformulation of the learned helplessness hypothesis, drawing upon 
attribution theory. This reformulation demonstrated that when people are exposed to 
uncontrollable events, they ask themselves why the event happened. The nature of any 
subsequent outcomes (such as learned helplessness or lowered self-esteem) is affected by the 
attributions the person makes along the dimensions of locus of causality, stability and globality 
(Abramson et al., 1978). A global attribution refers to the process of generalising the 
uncontrollability to all other situations with which the person is faced (such as generalising from 
the uncontrollable negative stimulus condition to a new, controllable negative stimulus 
condition). In contrast, a specific attribution refers to the process of perceiving the 
uncontrollability to occur only in a narrow range of situations. Abramson et al. also encouraged 
the distinction between helplessness that is personal (personal helplessness) and helplessness that 
is universal (universal helplessness). That is, the person may consider the cause of the 
helplessness to be unique to him/herself, or he/she may believe that the cause is common to all 
people. 
From this research, five principal attribution dimensions appear to have been proposed: 
locus of causality; controllability; stability; globality; and universality. As previously noted, 
locus of causality relates to whether the cause is inside or outside the person; controllability 
relates to whether the cause is controllable or uncontrollable. The other three dimensions are 
somewhat different, in that they deal with the generalisability of the cause of the event. That is, 
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does the cause generalise across time (stability), situations (globality) and/or other people 
(universality)? These three generalisability dimensions can be linked to the consistency, 
distinctiveness and consensus concepts of Kelley (1967) and F!rsterling (1988). More precisely, 
links can be made between consistency and stability, distinctiveness and globality, and consensus 
and universality. 
Controllability as the Primary Attribution Dimension 
Locus of causality and controllability are not easily distinguished, and an internal locus of 
causality has been observed to be positively associated with personal controllability (e.g., 
Ingledew, Hardy, & Cooper, 1996; McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992; Vallerand & Richer, 
1988). These two dimensions can, of course, be separated; for example, genetics may be 
considered internal but not controllable. The suggestion remains, however, that people may feel 
there is much overlap between where a cause lies and by whom it is controlled (Ingledew et al., 
1996). Models of practice imply that a greater focus on controllability rather than locus would be 
adaptive. Relapse prevention (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) suggests that, following a lapse in some 
positive behaviour, attributing to the self is a problem, because this leads to negative emotions 
and lowered self-efficacy. Instead, attributions to external, unstable and controllable aspects of 
the situation are recommended (e.g., the cause of the lapse may be external, but one is 
responsible for finding a way to overcome that cause). Den Boer, Kok, Hospers, Gerards, and 
Strecher (1991) pointed out that this is at odds with a frequent recommendation from attribution 
research that failures should generally be attributed to internal, unstable, and controllable causes, 
specifically lack of effort or strategy. There is agreement, however, between relapse prevention 
and attribution theory with regard to how attributions can be particularly unhelpful after a lapse: 
stable and uncontrollable attributions, whether they are internal or external, will lead to lowered 
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self-efficacy or expectations of success and thus a greater probability of total relapse. Compared 
with locus of causality, controllability may therefore be a more important dimension to focus 
upon. 
Controllability as an attribution dimension is not, however, explicitly assessed in 
explanatory style research (e.g., Buchanan & Seligman, 1995; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, 
Abramson, Metalski, & Seligman, 1982). Explanatory style, born out of the work of Abramson 
et al. (1978) on learned helplessness, reflects the way people habitually explain the causes of 
“bad events,” and spans the dimensions of locus of causality, stability and globality. Neither 
learned helplessness nor explanatory style explicitly assesses perceptions of controllability. 
Whilst learned helplessness has concerned itself with reactions to uncontrollable events, it 
appears to be assumed in explanatory style research that a bad event with an internal, stable, and 
global cause would be regarded as uncontrollable. This assumption has been heavily criticised by 
other researchers (e.g., Anderson & Deuser, 1991; Weiner, 1991), who have suggested that 
controllability is an important attribution dimension that should be directly assessed. In response 
to these criticisms, the prominent explanatory style researcher, Peterson (1991) noted that neglect 
of the controllability dimension in explanatory style research had become institutionalised, and 
that he was unsure how this position might change. 
On the other hand, controllability is considered the most important dimension in the 
research of Anderson and colleagues (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Deuser, 1993; 
Anderson & Riger, 1991). The central theme of this research is that people engage in 
attributional activity to increase their control of the environment; attributing an event to a 
controllable cause leads to expectations of control over events in the future1. Noting the 
implications of attribution research for therapy, Anderson (1983) stated, “In short, it is important 
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to focus attention on the aspects of the problem situations that the person can change and 
control” (p. 1145). 
Regarding expectations of future success, Weiner’s model points to stability being the 
most important attribution dimension: stable attributions lead to increased perceptions of 
certainty regarding future outcomes; unstable attributions lead to increased perceptions of 
uncertainty. Following failure, it should therefore help to make unstable attributions (things that 
could change in the future), such as attributions to effort2 or strategy, rather than stable 
attributions (things that will stay the same), such as attributions to lack of ability, because 
unstable attributions should lead to more positive perceptions about the opportunity for future 
success. This thinking has, however, been challenged in the sport psychology literature. Citing a 
sporting study by Grove and Pargman (1986), both Biddle et al. (2001) and Hardy et al. (1996) 
speculated that controllability could be more important. 
Grove and Pargman (1986) conducted three experiments to test whether stability was 
indeed the key dimension predicting future expectations. These researchers noted that research 
had tended to use non-competitive situations, so they used various methods to develop 
competitive situations, including a cash prize in their third experiment. Following success, 
expectancy of future success should be high, if attributions are made to stable causes (e.g., 
ability). Following failure, expectancy of future success should be low if the same stable 
attribution to ability is made. Instead, it would be functional and lead to higher expectancy of 
success being maintained following failure, if attributions were made to things that could change 
(unstable attributions, like effort). What Grove and Pargman found was that effort (an unstable 
attribution) led to the highest expectancy in both failure and success conditions. They felt such 
results could be explained by a focus on controllability rather than stability:  
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In addition to differing in stability, the causal factors of effort and ability differ in the 
degree to which the individual can control them. Personal control is more possible over 
effort than over ability. If one assumes that individuals will expect to do better under 
conditions where perceived control is high rather than low . . . then the pattern of results 
obtained in these studies is understandable. (p. 93) 
They also speculated that the uncertain nature of real-world competitive situations, involving 
changing interactions with competitors, conditions, terrain and so on, leads to a greater need to 
focus on controllability attributions than on stability attributions. Research should therefore focus 
primarily on controllability attributions. 
The Generalisability of Controllability 
Controllability is the primary dimension to focus upon; alone it is not sufficient, however. 
How controllability generalises across time (consistency/stability), situations 
(distinctiveness/globality), and people (consensus/universality) may ultimately influence 
emotions, expectations and performance. The effects of attributions have almost invariably been 
observed by considering attribution dimensions individually or as composite scores. To model 
how controllability generalises implies the need to consider interactive effects of attribution 
dimensions (see, e.g., Carver, 1989). Examples of this practice have been seen (Anderson & 
Riger, 1991; Brown & Siegel, 1988; Ingledew et al., 1996). For example, Ingledew et al. found 
that, after failure, if the cause was perceived as likely to recur (stable) and externally 
controllable, participants were anxious. If the cause was perceived as unlikely to recur (unstable), 
participants retained efficacy expectations, regardless of degree of external controllability. Based 
upon the premise of the present paper, research should focus upon the main effects of 
controllability, together with the interactive effects of controllability and the three 
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generalisability dimensions of stability (consistency), globality (distinctiveness), and universality 
(consensus) upon outcomes. By focusing upon these four dimensions, locus of causality is 
marginalised. Although sport psychologists have accepted uncritically the locus of causality 
dimension (Biddle, 1988, 1993; Biddle et al., 2001), we are proposing that it is an 
epiphenomenon of the attribution process. People do make internal and external attributions. 
These are, however, largely irrelevant for sport psychology, because regardless of where the 
cause of an event lies, controllability is the central concern. 
Assessing Attributions 
Various methods have been employed in the measurement and categorisation of 
attributions. Open-ended methods involve the researcher categorising the oral replies of 
participants to open-ended questions. Derived score methods require the participant to rate 
his/her reasons for, for example, a success or failure on 5-point scales for different elements 
(e.g., ability or effort) related to the attribution dimensions. The direct rating method (e.g., 
Benson, 1989), requires the participant to state his/her reasons for the event and then map those 
reasons onto items referring to attribution dimensions. For a discussion of measures used in sport 
psychology research (e.g., Russell’s 1982 Causal Dimension Scale; Hanrahan, Grove, & Hattie’s 
1989 Sport Attributional Style Scale), the reader is referred to Biddle (1988), Biddle and 
Hanrahan (1998) and Biddle et al. (2001). Based upon the premise of the present paper that 
controllability is the key dimension to focus upon, measures of attributions should include four 
scales, for controllability and the generalisability dimensions of stability, globality, and 
universality. Benson’s 5-Attributional Dimension Scale (5-ADS: this is an extension of the 4-
ADS, cited in Benson, 1989) does assess these four scales, as well as locus of causality. This 
scale has, however, been little used, so its psychometric properties are uncertain. Because a well-
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validated measure for these four dimensions does not exist at present, this is an urgent future 
research issue. 
As well as the measurement of attributions, there is an urgent need to consider the most 
appropriate empirical paradigms to use in future research. For example, although cross-sectional 
studies might help our understanding of the attributions people make and their subsequent effects 
on emotions, expectations and performance, longitudinal studies could reveal much more 
important information about how attributions alter over time. Like the conceptualisation of 
coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), one might consider the process of attributional thought as a 
dynamic, transactional process over time, with attributions affecting responses, responses 
affecting future appraisal of the environment, and appraisal leading to altered attributions. The 
coping literature (Tennen, Affleck, Armeli, & Carney, 2000) offers suggestions for appropriate 
methodologies here. For example, instead of further cross-sectional studies, or even longitudinal 
studies using just two or three time points, one should consider methods such as ecological 
momentary assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994), or experience sampling (Csikzentmihalyi & 
Larson, 1984). These methods would allow a much more detailed observation of naturally 
occurring attributions over time, the interaction with the environment and the reattribution 
process. 
Researchers should also consider the issue of whether respondents actually think about 
and comprehend assessment items and attribution dimensions in a similar fashion to researchers. 
Anderson (1991) noted the lack of familiarity people have with the concept of dimensional 
thinking, suggesting one should not presume respondents’ answers on the scales are an accurate 
reflection of how they are thinking. In this regard, the direct rating method is potentially 
problematic. One could, however, take a questionnaire such as Benson’s (1989) 5-ADS and 
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engage respondents in “think aloud” methods, such as verbal protocol analysis (e.g., Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993), as they fill out the scales. Such an approach might help to address these issues and 
serve to highlight any problems with the measurement instruments constructed. 
The CAVE technique (Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations) has been used as a 
means to assess data from open-ended questionnaires completed 35 years previously (Peterson, 
Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988). Using the CAVE technique, Peterson et al. were able to 
demonstrate that a pessimistic explanatory style in Harvard University students at age 25 
predicted poorer health at ages 45 through 60. Alternative approaches to assessing attributions in 
sport have already been advocated. Biddle et al. (2001) described the recent development of the 
Leeds Attributional Coding System (LACS: Munton, Silvester, Stratton, & Hanks, 1998). The 
LACS is used to analyse attributions occurring naturally in conversation, and involves the 
researcher coding the participants’ responses into attribution dimensions. This part-qualitative, 
part-quantitative method might be a useful alternative to questionnaire methods. Alongside this 
and the previously mentioned quantitative methods, one could also argue that any number of 
varied qualitative methodologies, such as categorical-content analysis (Lieblich, Tuval-
Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998), paradigmatic analysis (Polkinghorne, 1995), conversation analysis 
(see, e.g., Faulkner & Finlay, 2002), or narrative analysis, (see, e.g., Crossley, 2000; Sparkes, 
1999) might help us better understand and interpret the attributions people make, and allow us to 
view the day-to-day process of attributional thinking. 
Implications for Practice 
The relevance of dimensionalising attributions has been questioned, on grounds that 
people may or may not think in dimensional terms. Anderson (1991) stated, “People do not 
dimensionalise their causal thinking and then derive a cause. The cause emerges quickly, as do 
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the implications for action” (p. 324). Despite such comments, Anderson admits that people can 
think in attribution dimension terms, and in sport it has been suggested that in designing 
attribution (re)training programs, it is important to emphasise the dimensions of attributions 
rather than the attribution itself (Orbach et al., 1997), because different people can consider 
specific reasons in different attribution dimension terms. Den Boer et al. (1991) also argued: 
It should be clear that it is not the attribution itself which is important, but the perception 
subjects have of the [dimensionality] of these attributions. It is this perception of the 
dimensions that is responsible for the effect of attributions on expectation of success, 
emotions and behaviour. (p. 243) 
Vallerand’s (1987) intuitive-reflective appraisal model of emotion in sport suggests that 
whilst there is an immediate intuitive appraisal of an event, there is also a reflective appraisal, 
involving greater thought and attributional processing. Because interventions are often about 
changing people’s habitually negative ways of thinking (e.g., F!rsterling, 1988), it seems quite 
legitimate to help people go beyond their intuitive appraisals to think in ways that are not 
habitual. Indeed, what practitioners might typically do is try to help athletes not to jump to 
intuitive reactions. Instead, they might encourage athletes to engage in Vallerand’s reflective 
appraisal, and ask questions that challenge attributional thinking, leading them to a clearer 
understanding of their own reality. This raises an issue of timing (Ingledew et al., 1996); timing 
when to intervene is a crucial skill for the practitioner. It may require an appreciation of when to 
wait until the person is ready to be challenged, or waiting until the person has begun to 
reinterpret the situation, instead of working in a prescriptive manner. This is similar to 
considering the stage of change the individual is at (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983), with 
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different interventions required at different stages of change. Clearly, this would also be a fertile 
area for future research. 
Timing is also pertinent in relation to the self-serving bias (see, e.g., Bradley, 1978). The 
self-serving bias refers to the way people attribute successes to internal factors (e.g., ability), and 
failures to external factors (e.g., poor refereeing). Evidence for this bias in sport has been 
inconsistent (Mullen & Riordan, 1988; Van Raalte, 1994). Schoenemann and Curry (1990) 
suggested that attributions immediately following an event might indeed reflect the self-serving 
bias. These authors further suggested that in time, however, people tend towards personal 
changeability, wherein they take personal responsibility for both successes and failures, but in a 
way that makes failure reversible and under personal control. 
Regardless of where the cause lies, we would contend that, whilst engaging the 
sportsperson in Vallerand’s (1987) reflective appraisal, the central emphasis of interventions 
using an attribution theory perspective should be on controllability. The secondary focus should 
then be on how attributions generalise across time (consistency/stability), situations 
(distinctiveness/globality), and people (consensus/universality). Vallerand’s intuitive-reflective 
appraisal model raises an important issue in relation to this: immediately following a negative 
event, one should prevent people from catastrophising and generalising perceptions of 
uncontrollability. Again, we know of no empirical evidence to suggest people do this, so this 
would be an avenue for future research. Whilst early work into attributions suggested that 
“ordinary” people could behave in the manner of lay, naïve, or intuitive scientists, such 
behaviour may be detrimental when it is unwittingly operated in a dysfunctional fashion in the 
immediacy of an event. Unless more time and effort is expended on reflection to seek rational 
explanations for failures or negative events, people can tend towards being cognitive misers 
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(Taylor, 1981), whereby they jump to quick, often inappropriate and unhelpful, judgments, 
without careful thought. 
Sport psychologists might consider working through the following stages to deal with 
people’s maladaptive attributions: 1) identify the person’s current attributional state, paying 
particular attention to the dimensionality of the attribution, the elapsed time since the event for 
which the attribution has been made, the controllability of the attribution, and the generalisability 
of perceptions of uncontrollability across time, situations, and people; 2) use consistency, 
distinctiveness, and consensus information to probe further, to focus upon what they can and 
cannot control, and to help them create more constructive attributions; and 3) help them better 
come to terms with those aspects over which they genuinely have no control. The work of Kelley 
(1967) and F!rsterling (1988) would be an invaluable resource here. Additionally, practitioners 
might train their clients to conduct this process for themselves. The role of practitioners might 
then be to create a context for empowering individuals and fostering constructive attributions: in 
a sense, helping them to become their own psychologist. 
The Social Context 
People do not engage in attributional thought in a vacuum. Invariably, attributions are 
made in a social context, and social factors influence attributions (Hardy & Jones, 1994). For 
example, publicly declared attributions have been found to show less self-serving bias than 
private attributions (Rejeski & Brawley, 1983). In private, there is no one to refute the 
attributions one makes; in public, or in the presence of important, critical, and respected others, 
and with the possibility of future evaluation, attributions are often tempered. Rejeski and 
Brawley noted that social conditions may influence self-presentations: “people manage the 
attributions they make to others in order to gain public approval or avoid public embarrassment” 
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(p. 87). So, if challenged, attributions could change straightaway. A team manager/coach might 
instinctively make attributions to uncontrollable factors in the immediacy of a poor result in a 
football match, for example, poor refereeing. Under close personal scrutiny, however, perhaps by 
the media, the team manager/coach might be seen to change towards assuming a greater 
responsibility for events. 
Sportspeople are known to discuss all manner of subjects with family, friends, other 
performers, coaches, psychologists, sponsors, the media and so on, with these others providing 
different types of emotional, esteem, informational and tangible social support (Rees & Hardy, 
2000). Attributions may be discussed either explicitly or implicitly in these formal and informal 
settings. Because maladaptive attributions often lead to performers getting into a helplessness 
spiral, people might readily offer advice to the sportsperson that helps him/her think differently 
about the causes of events. This advice may help the performer. Equally, potential supporters 
might do more harm than good; they might misread the situation and misdirect their support 
(e.g., Lehman, Ellard, and Wortman, 1986). For example, they might encourage a focus on lack 
of effort as a reason for failure, even though the person had expended high effort. 
Potential helpers frequently make attributions about the cause of the behaviour before 
considering giving help and support. For example, if it is considered that a negative event could 
have been controlled by the person, a potential helper may be less inclined to offer help than if 
the event was considered personally uncontrollable. How people subsequently behave towards us 
can have a tremendous impact upon our thoughts, feelings and behaviours following an event 
(e.g., Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998). The work of Meyer and colleagues (e.g., 1982, 1992) has 
highlighted just this, demonstrating how indirect communication influences a person’s 
attributional thought. For example, take the scenario of two runners attaining the qualifying time 
Attribution 22 
for the Olympics, but just one being heavily praised for this achievement by the national coach. 
This runner might engage in attributional thought, asking himself a number of questions as to 
why this isolated praise was offered. The questions might take the following form: “Why did I 
alone receive praise? Was the coach surprised? Was the coach commending me for my efforts? 
Was the coach implying that my efforts had made up for my lack of genuine ability?” This might 
precipitate an attribution to low ability. The extent to which this uncontrollable attribution then 
generalises (is seen as stable, global and/or universal) might determine emotions, expectations, 
and subsequent performance. Equally, when trying to solve problems, recipients of unsought for 
help often jump to the conclusion that the help-giver considers them to lack ability. Even 
praising intelligence has been found to undermine motivation and performance (Mueller & 
Dweck, 1998). So, indirect communication can have a profound influence on attributional 
thought. Although in physical education teachers have been observed to show a preference for 
students expending high effort (Biddle & Goudas, 1997), more direct feedback to a student that 
he or she succeeded because of high effort expenditure might unintentionally undermine ability 
beliefs (Okolo, 1992; Rejeski & Brawley, 1983). 
An adjunct to the social context of attributions is actor-observer differences. Hardy and 
Jones (1994) and Biddle et al. (2001) have suggested that, as well as personal attributions for 
interpersonal and achievement outcomes, one should consider actor-observer differences in 
attributions. These researchers suggested that this would be particularly beneficial to the study of 
athlete-coach interactions and refer to this as a divergent perspectives approach, because two 
people might make different attributions for the same event. The work of Heider (1944, 1958), 
Jones and Davis (1965), and Kelley (1967) did indeed address such social phenomena. Their 
work dealt with people’s attributions for others’ action. The focus of this work was on how 
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people try to develop a meaningful understanding about events they observe in everyday life. 
This social-psychological framework for studying attributions is still an area of interest (e.g., 
Carr & MacLachlan, 1998; Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Hewstone, 1989; Robins, Spranca, & 
Mendelsohn, 1996). The correspondence bias, or fundamental attribution error (see, e.g., Gilbert 
& Malone, 1995; Jones, 1990) relates to how, even when it is fairly clear that behaviour has been 
situationally driven, people tend to attribute behaviour to others’ dispositions. Indeed, observers 
tend to make dispositional attributions for the actions of others, whilst the actors themselves 
make situational attributions for the same event (see, e.g., Hewstone, 1989). Heider (1944) 
wrote: “Changes in the environment are almost always caused by acts of persons in combination 
with other factors. The tendency exists to ascribe the changes entirely to persons” (p. 361). 
In alluding to the social context of attributions in sport psychology, Rejeski and Brawley 
(1983) expressed concern that researchers had tended to examine only performers’ self-
attributions, and had not considered that “observers of a skill, a competition, or a social 
interaction process in sport make attributions about the outcomes of actors” (p. 84). This is 
probably because research had tended to focus attention on the work of Weiner. Whilst Weiner’s 
work has had a great impact on research in sport psychology, it has done so at the expense of 
earlier, fruitful perspectives. In Rejeski and Brawley’s review of the status of attribution research 
at that time in sport psychology, they criticised the unquestioning use of Weiner’s model, stating, 
“it may not necessarily be an appropriate model to test in the sport context” (p. 83). Instead, they 
suggested that the passive acceptance of Weiner’s model should be switched to a broader 
conceptual approach in future work. Twenty years on, this criticism remains at least as valid as 
when it was originally written (see, also, Biddle, 1988, 1993; Biddle et al., 2001). Indeed, the 
present authors would contend that this narrow focus, coupled with a failure to ask and answer 
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interesting questions, has been a major factor in the demise of attributional research in sport 
psychology.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has outlined the complex and subtle role of attributions in sport psychology. It 
has hinted at a mismatch between research and practice in sport psychology. In this regard, 
consideration of the consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information outlined by Kelley 
(1967) and F!rsterling (1988) would be beneficial. A link has been made between these three 
types of information and attribution dimensions: consistency with stability, distinctiveness with 
globality, and consensus with universality. The similarity between locus and controllability has 
been highlighted, with the proposal that controllability is the key attribution dimension. Although 
people do make internal and external attributions, the locus of causality dimension is of less 
psychological significance to research and practice in sport psychology than is controllability. 
This is because, regardless of where the cause of an event lies, controllability is the central 
concern. It is little wonder then that there has been a decline in research interest in attributions in 
sport, if sport psychologists have been researching the wrong variable and asking the wrong 
questions. Research should now focus upon the main effects of controllability, together with the 
interactive effects of controllability and the three generalisability dimensions of stability 
(consistency), globality (distinctiveness), and universality (consensus) upon emotions, 
expectations and performance. Measurement needs to reflect this, and both quantitative and 
qualitative forms of inquiry may help aid understanding in this area. In applied settings, one 
should focus on the generalisability of controllability across time, situations and people, and 
challenge people’s attributional thinking, engaging them in Vallerand’s (1987) reflective 
appraisal. Finally, the social context of attributions should be considered. Research has tended to 
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view the attribution process in a narrow, non-social and prescriptive way, and has not taken heed 
of many of the diverse attribution concepts in the literature in general (social) psychology. 
Research has also missed the subtle process and the skills of the applied, reflective, scientist-
practitioner. Just as research informs practice, so practice can help guide research. 
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Footnotes 
1 One should note here the sometimes illusory nature of control and the debate (e.g., 
Colvin & Block, 1994; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994) on whether a realistic or an illusional view 
of events has advantages for psychological health and well-being. For example, Alloy and 
Abramson (1979) were drawn to ask whether depressives, being perhaps more accurate in their 
perceptions of uncontrollability than non-depressed participants, were “sadder but wiser,” 
because they simply had more realistic views of events. 
2 For the purpose of this argument, effort is considered an unstable attribution. We 
appreciate, however, that categorising attributions is sometimes unclear. For example, some 
individuals would characterise themselves as always being lazy (a stable attribution). 
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